

The economic meaning of Data Envelopment Analysis: a ‘behavioral’ perspective*

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November 25, 2013

Abstract

We reconsider the motivation of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), the non-parametric technique that is widely employed for analyzing productive efficiency in academia, the private sector and the public sector. We first argue that the conventional engineering motivation of DEA can be problematic since it often builds on unverifiable production axioms. We then provide a dual viewpoint and highlight the ‘behavioral’ interpretation of DEA models. We start from a specification of the production objectives while imposing minimal structure on the production possibilities, and construct tools to meaningfully quantify deviations of observed producer behavior from optimizing behavior. This brings to light the economic meaning of DEA, provides guidelines for selecting the appropriate model in practical research settings, and prepares the ground for instituting new DEA models. We also provide an empirical application that demonstrates the practical relevance of our arguments. We hope that our insights will contribute to the further dissemination of DEA, and stimulate public sector applications of DEA that build on its behavioral interpretation.

*Helpful comments by the guest editor, two anonymous referees, Kris Kerstens, Joep Konings, Knox Lovell, Wim Moesen, Stef Proost, Tom Van Puyenbroeck and André Watteyne on an earlier version of this paper are gratefully acknowledged. The exposition also benefited from insightful discussions with Timo Kuosmanen, Thierry Post and Holger Scheel.

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JEL Classification: C14, C61, D21, D24.

Keywords: Non-parametric production analysis, economic efficiency, DEA.

1 Introduction

The public sector is increasingly interested in the productive efficiency of its entities. For instance, Coelli et al. (2003) extensively discuss the relevance of efficiency evaluations for regulated sectors. More generally, the growing number of empirical applications suggests that productive efficiency analysis is of key interest for many sectors such as academia, the business community and government institutions; see, e.g., Gattoufi et al. (2004) and Emrouzenjad et al. (2008) for overviews. This observation calls for well-established empirical tools that are specially tailored for testing consistency of observed behavior with (theoretical) optimizing behavior, and for quantifying deviations from optimization (or ‘inefficiencies’).

Afriat (1972), Hanoch and Rothschild (1972), Diewert and Parkan (1983) and Varian (1984), among others, have advocated a ‘behavioral’ non-parametric approach to analyzing producer behavior. This approach starts from a behavioral model of optimizing/efficient behavior and allows for testing implications of micro-economic theory directly on the data. That is, one does not need a functional representation of the production technology, and so one can minimize the risk of erroneously rejecting optimizing producer behavior due to an erroneous parametric specification of the (typically unknown) technology. This is particularly convenient, since economic theory does in general not imply a particular functional form and reliable specification tests are not available in many cases.

Non-parametric efficiency analysis is increasingly applied for measuring the degree of ‘efficiency’ of observed producer behavior, most commonly under the label ‘Data Envelopment Analysis’ (DEA; after Charnes et al. (1978)).¹ DEA models are conventionally motivated from ‘engineering’ information, e.g. pertaining to the prevalent returns-to-scale or the marginal rates of input substitution/output transformation. Still, such engineering information is mostly difficult to verify in practice. In fact, imposing production properties that cannot be justified in a convincing way seems to conflict directly with the very nature of non-parametric analysis, which

¹See Färe, Grosskopf and Lovell (1994), Cooper, Seiford and Tone (2007), Fried et al. (2008), and Cook and Seiford (2009) for extensive surveys of DEA models.

is often credited for imposing minimal structure on the research setting under investigation. This consideration is particularly relevant for DEA evaluations of the public sector, which are usually characterized by minimal information on the nature of production possibilities.

In this paper, we adopt an ‘economic’ (as opposed to ‘engineering’) perspective on DEA: we start from a clear specification of the production-behavioral models and use minimal (non-verifiable) engineering information. Our insights re-interpret DEA efficiency measures as measures for violations of economically optimizing behavior. To keep our exposition simple, we mainly focus on profit maximizing and cost minimizing behavior. However, as we will indicate, our insights readily extend towards alternative production-behavioral models. By making explicit this economic motivation of DEA, we hope to contribute to its further dissemination and to stimulate public sector applications of DEA that build on its behavioral interpretation.

We note at the outset that our discussion bears some analogy to that in Banker and Maindiratta (1988), Varian (1990) and Färe and Grosskopf (1995), where a similar interpretation of DEA efficiency measures is (implicitly) advocated.² Unfortunately, although these ideas have some clear advantages, they are only minimally used in the applied DEA literature; see, e.g., Cherchye et al. (2008, 2011 and 2012) for some applications that demonstrate the advantages of the behavioral perspective of DEA. If only for that reason, it seems useful to set out methodological guidelines for economically meaningful applications of DEA. Furthermore, our discussion includes a number of insights that have not yet been articulated in the literature, and prepares the ground for instituting new DEA models depending on the production-behavioral model that is subject to testing.

The remainder of this paper unfolds as follows. In Section 2 we briefly review the conventional ‘axiomatic’ DEA approach for reconstructing production possibilities. Section 3 is concerned with non-parametric economic efficiency analysis, following the perspective of Afriat (1972), Hanoch and Rothschild (1972), Diewert and Parkan (1983) and Varian (1984). Section 4 bridges the gap between the seemingly distinct viewpoints adopted in Sections 2 and 3, and brings to light the economic meaning of DEA. Section 5 presents an empirical application on efficiency in academia and illustrates the relevance of choosing an appropriate DEA model. Section 6, finally, reproduces

²Actually, some of the ideas that we develop here were already implicit in the seminal DEA paper of Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984).

the main insights and provides some concluding discussion.

2 Reconstructing production possibilities: an axiomatic approach

A producer creates outputs from various combinations of inputs (factors of production). To study producer choices we need a convenient way to summarize the production possibilities, i.e. which inputs and outputs are *technologically feasible*. The set of all technologically feasible input-output combinations is called the *production possibility set*.

To formally represent that set, we denote by $z = (z^1, \dots, z^q) \in \mathbb{R}^q$ a (non-zero) netput vector with z^j the value of netput commodity j . Positive components of z represent outputs and negative components represent inputs. Throughout we assume that the vector z captures at least one input and at least one output, and that all producers use the same commodities as inputs and produce the same outputs. The production technology is represented by the (non-empty and closed) production possibility set

$$T = \{z \in \mathbb{R}^q \mid \text{netput } z \text{ is technically feasible}\}. \quad (1)$$

If we make the explicit distinction between input and output vectors, we use $z = (-x, y)$ with $x \in \mathbb{R}_+^l$ the input vector and $y \in \mathbb{R}_+^m$ the output vector ($q = l + m$). Then, the set T can be decomposed into input requirement sets

$$L_T(y) = \{x \in \mathbb{R}_+^l \mid (-x, y) \in T\}, \quad (2)$$

which contain all input vectors x that can produce the output vector y .

Production axioms. The true production possibility set T (or the input requirement set $L_T(\cdot)$) is usually not observed. Therefore the DEA-type axiomatic approach typically approximates the unobserved set T by an empirical production set that is constructed from a set of observed producers. We represent each observed producer s by the netput vector $z_s = (-x_s, y_s)$,

with $s \in S = \{1, \dots, |S|\}$, for S the set of observed producers. To construct the empirical approximation of T , we will consider the production axioms **A1-A4**.³

A1 (inclusion of observations): $\forall s \in S : (-x_s, y_s) \in T$.

This axiom says that all observed netput vectors are technologically feasible and thus that they should belong to the (unobserved) production set T . This is really an empirical postulate rather than a production postulate. It makes that we exclude empirical phenomena such as measurement error or outlier behavior.⁴

A2 (monotonicity): if $z \in T$ and $z' \leq z$ then $z' \in T$.

Monotonicity, sometimes also referred to as ‘strong (or free) disposability’ of inputs and outputs, implies that the producer can always costlessly dispose unwanted inputs and/or outputs. That is, more inputs cannot lead to producing less outputs and producing less outputs cannot lead to using more inputs. It implies that marginal rates of substitution/transformation (between inputs, between outputs and between inputs and outputs) are nowhere negative or, in other words, there is no congestion.

A3 (convexity in netput space): if $z \in T$ and $z' \in T$, then $\lambda z + (1 - \lambda) z' \in T$ for all $\lambda \in [0, 1]$.

A4 (convexity in input space): if $x \in L_T(y)$ and $x' \in L_T(y)$, then $\lambda x + (1 - \lambda) x' \in L_T(y)$ for all $\lambda \in [0, 1]$.

Convexity in netput space entails that marginal rates of substitution/transformation (between inputs, between outputs and between inputs and outputs) are nowhere increasing. Convexity in input space, finally, is a weaker version of **A3** and entails non-decreasing marginal rates of input substitution.

Apart from these specific production axioms, the (axiomatic) DEA approach typically builds on a ‘minimal extrapolation’ requirement, which says that the production set approximation should be the minimal set that is consistent with the axioms adopted; see Banker et al. (1984).

³In a theoretical framework, Shephard (1970) provides a comprehensive list of production axioms (including ours), which we do not intend to fully review. Other axioms presented in the DEA literature (see, e.g., Färe et al. (1994)) are not considered because they are not instrumental to our following discussion.

⁴See, e.g., Grosskopf (1996) for extensions of DEA that weaken this assumption.

Production set approximations. Different production set approximations are obtained from different sets of axioms. First, if we impose axioms **A1** and **A2**, then the resulting production set approximation consistent with the minimum extrapolation principle is the monotone hull of the data: $M(S)$.⁵

$$M(S) = \{z \in \mathbb{R}^q \mid z \leq z_s \text{ for some } s \in S\} \quad (3)$$

Second, if we additionally assume convexity in the netput space (i.e. axiom **A3**), then we get the convex monotone hull of the data: $CM(S)$.⁶

$$CM(S) = \left\{ z \in \mathbb{R}^q \mid \forall s \in S : z \leq \sum_{s \in S} \lambda_s z_s, \lambda_s \geq 0 \text{ and } \sum_{s \in S} \lambda_s = 1 \right\} \quad (4)$$

Finally, replacing axiom **A3** by axiom **A4** leads to the approximation $CIM(S)$, which corresponds to $M(S)$ with the additional property that input requirement sets are convex.⁷

$$CIM(S) = \left\{ (-x, y) \in \mathbb{R}^q \mid \begin{array}{l} \forall s \in S : x \geq \sum_{s \in S} \lambda_s x_s \text{ and } \lambda_s y \leq \lambda_s y_s \\ \text{with } \lambda_s \geq 0 \text{ and } \sum_{s \in S} \lambda_s = 1 \end{array} \right\} \quad (5)$$

Increasing stringency of the different assumptions underlying these three production set approximations implies

$$M(S) \subseteq CIM(S) \subseteq CM(S). \quad (6)$$

The sets $M(S)$, $CM(S)$ and $CIM(S)$ are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 for respectively netput space and input space. Figure 1 represents these production set approximations for a situation with 3 producers that use a single input to produce a single output, i.e. $S_1 = \{1, 2, 3\}$ and $z_s = (-x_s, y_s) \in \mathbb{R}_- \times \mathbb{R}_+$, with $s \in S$. The monotone hull of the data $M(S_1)$ is the area under the full line, while $CM(S_1)$ coincides with the area under the dotted line. Observe further that for this particular situation (with only one input and one output) $M(S_1) = CIM(S_1)$. Figure 2 represents the input requirement sets for a situation with 3 producers that each produce the same output with two inputs, i.e. $S_2 = \{1, 2, 3\}$ and $z_s = (-x_s, y_0) \in \mathbb{R}_-^2 \times \mathbb{R}_+$, with $s \in S$.

⁵See Afriat (1972) for more discussion. Deprins et al. (1984) and Tulkens (1993) suggested this approximation in a DEA context.

⁶See Afriat (1972) for more discussion. Banker et al. (1984) proposed it in a DEA context.

⁷See Hanoch and Rothschild (1972) for more discussion. Bogetoft (1996) considers this approximation in a DEA context.

As the three producers in S_2 produce exactly the same output y_0 , we get that $L_{CM(S_2)}(y_0) = L_{CIM(S_2)}(y_0)$.




Figure 1: Empirical production possibility sets




Figure 2: Empirical production possibility sets

From these illustrations we can conclude that production axioms directly affect the empirical

production set. Hence, an important question pertains to the validity of these axioms. Unfortunately, there does not seem to exist any a priori reason why a production set should necessarily be monotone or convex. In fact, it turns out that monotonicity and convexity assumptions are problematic in many practical settings, and that reliable non-parametric specification tests are currently not available; see Cherchye and Post (2003) for an in-depth discussion. McFadden (1978; pp. 8-9) aptly summarizes that the common rationale for monotonicity and convexity assumptions in production theory lies in their analytical convenience rather than in their economic realism. As such a ‘non-engineering’ justification of DEA is recommendable, which motivates our ‘behavioral’ (or ‘economic’) perspective in the next section.

3 Economic efficiency analysis: a non-parametric approach

While the axiomatic approach focuses on the specification of production possibilities, we now take the *dual* perspective: we start from a specification of the production objectives and impose the least structure on the production possibilities. Production objectives vary in different situations. The most frequently maintained position is that producers pursue profit maximization. In some instances, however, cost minimization for given output might seem a more reasonable assumption. For instance, when the producer is a price taker in input markets but operates in regulated output markets (as is often the case for public agencies).

In the following, we focus on profit and cost efficiency analysis of producer k ($\in S$), i.e. the producer associated with netput choice $z_k = (-x_k, y_k)$. In the first subsection, we assume that profit efficiency and cost efficiency are evaluated at (non-zero) price vectors $p_k \in \mathbb{R}_+^q$ and $w_k \in \mathbb{R}_+^l$, respectively. In the second subsection we deal with the setting in which this price information is not available.

3.1 Cost and profit efficiency with price information

The minimum cost that could have been achieved by producer k (i.e. the producer associated with input choice x_k) when producing y_k is⁸

$$c_T(z_k, w_k) = \min_{x \in L_T(y_k)} xw_k. \quad (7)$$

We say that producer k acts cost efficiently if the observed cost equals the minimum cost (i.e. $x_k w_k = c_T(z_k, w_k)$) and cost inefficiently if $c_T(z_k, w_k)$ is below $x_k w_k$.

Similarly, the maximum attainable profit at p_k is defined as

$$\pi_T(z_k, p_k) = \max_{z \in T} zp_k. \quad (8)$$

Again, profit efficiency (resp. inefficiency) is achieved by producer k when $z_k p_k = \pi_T(z_k, p_k)$ (resp. $z_k p_k < \pi_T(z_k, p_k)$).

Inefficient production behavior is often observed in practice and can have different interpretations; see, e.g., Demsetz (1997) for an extensive discussion. Observed producer inefficiency can be interpreted in at least two ways. First, the producer optimization problem may be ill-specified. For example, the producers objective function can be erroneously defined; e.g. the objective function may not be fully linear in netputs (due to imperfect competition). Second, as the specified producer objective is typically that of producer owners, producer inefficiency can also be interpreted as would the producer owners incompletely control the producer managers (i.e. inefficiency due to agency problems). Both explanations instantiate the need for economic efficiency *measures*, to serve either as indicators of ‘economic significance’ of specification errors (see Varian, 1990) or as ‘performance’ indicators (and possible monitoring instruments for producer owners; see Bogetoft (1994)).

Intuitively, meaningful efficiency measures give us an idea about how ‘close’ observed behavior is to optimizing behavior. In general, a reasonable measure of ‘closeness’ tells us how far the producer fails to optimize the postulated objective function. For example, when the production objective is specified as profit maximization, a reasonable measure should capture how much

⁸For simplicity we assume that minimum cost (in (7)) and maximum profit (in (8)) is defined wherever needed.

additional profit the producer could have acquired if it had behaved differently.

Cost efficiency measurement. For $x_k w_k > 0$, Farrell (1957) suggests as a measure for cost efficiency the ratio of minimal to actual cost, i.e.

$$C_T(z_k, w_k) = \frac{c_T(z_k, w_k)}{x_k w_k}. \quad (9)$$

It is clear that $C_T(z_k, w_k) \in [0, 1]$.⁹

As discussed above, the precise specification of T is usually unknown. Therefore, the starting point within the non-parametric approach to analyzing production behavior is that a (non-empty) subset $\{(-x_s, y_s) | s \in S\} \subseteq T$ is observed (i.e. axiom **A1** in Section 2). In principle, one may conduct a cost efficiency analysis by replacing T by this set. This gives minimal (‘necessary’) non-parametric tests for economic efficiency and upper bound estimates for the degree of cost inefficiency, i.e. $C_S(z_k, w_k) \geq C_T(z_k, w_k)$ by construction (for some $k \in S$).

However, in practice additional assumptions about the set $L_T(\cdot)$ can be useful.¹⁰ For example, Varian (1984) assumes that less output does not require more input, i.e.

A5 (free output disposability): if $(-x, y) \in T$ and $y' \leq y$, then $(-x, y') \in T$.

Axiom **A5** is a weaker version of the monotonicity axiom **A2**. We note that our below reasoning is easily extended to accommodate for alternative assumptions regarding output disposability (like those considered in Färe et al. (1994)).

As in the previous section, we can then again obtain an approximation of the production possibility set. Axiom **A1** and axiom **A5**, combined with the minimal extrapolation requirement, leads to

$$OM(S) = \{(-x_s, y) | y \leq y_s \text{ for some } s \in S\}. \quad (10)$$

Note that by construction $OM(S)$ is a subset of the set $M(S)$, defined in (3), since the latter

⁹This measure is not defined for $x_k w_k = 0$. Given that $x \in \mathbb{R}_+^l$ for all $(-x, y_k) \in T$ and $w_k \in \mathbb{R}_+^l$ we have $x_k w_k = c_T(z_k, w_k) = 0$ in that case. That is, cost efficiency is attained, and we can assign a cost efficiency value of unity to producer k . To keep the exposition simple we abstract from this case in the following.

¹⁰This enlarges the set of possible comparison partners. Otherwise, cost efficiency analysis, for example, could only compare the cost level of the evaluated producer to that of other observed producers that produce exactly the same output vector, of which the number is usually very small. However, it is worth emphasizing that cost efficiency analysis is possible even when only using axiom **A1**. An insightful discussion of this point is given by Tulkens and Vanden Eeckaut (1999).

assumes monotonicity for the set T .

When axioms **A1** and **A5** are rightly conjectured, necessary tests for cost efficiency can be performed with respect to $OM(S)$ and an upper bound for the cost efficiency measure in (9) can be derived, i.e. $C_{OM(S)}(z_k, w_k) \geq C_T(z_k, w_k)$ for some $k \in S$.

Profit efficiency measurement. Nerlove (1965) proposed two types of measures: difference measures and ratio measures. We restrict attention to ratio profit efficiency measures, since these measures have a convenient degree interpretation.¹¹

We need to distinguish two cases. First, for $\pi_T(z_k, p_k) > 0$ we define the degree measure

$$\Pi_T^+(z_k, p_k) = \frac{z_k p_k}{\pi_T(z_k, p_k)}. \quad (11)$$

Second, for $\pi_T(z_k, p_k) \leq 0$ and $z_k p_k < 0$ we define

$$\Pi_T^-(z_k, p_k) = \frac{\pi_T(z_k, p_k)}{z_k p_k}. \quad (12)$$

Note that in the limiting case $\pi_T(p_k) = z_k p_k = 0$ profit efficiency occurs. Consequently, we can simply attribute an efficiency value of unity to producer k in that case, i.e. $\Pi_T(z_k, p_k) = 1$ if $\pi_T(p_k) = z_k p_k = 0$. Obviously, $\Pi_T(z_k, p_k) \in (-\infty, 1]$ with a value of unity revealing profit efficiency and a value below unity capturing feasible relative profit increase.

Finally, we again have to approximate T by using the set of observed netput vectors (indexed by S). As discussed above, this could lead to several different approximations ($M(S), CIM(S), \dots$). For the sake of brevity, we will make abstraction of this discussion in the setting of profit efficiency measurement and we will only focus on the setting that starts from the observed set of netput vectors (i.e. we only impose axiom **A1**.)

¹¹Within the non-parametric literature difference and ratio measures for profit efficiency have been discussed by Banker and Maindiratta (1988). Our basic insights readily extend towards difference measures; compare with Cherchye and Van Puyenbroeck (2007). In addition, ratio measures are easy to work with under limited price information (see our discussion in Section 3.2). At this point, it is also worth indicating that Chambers et al. (1998) considered a general class of profit efficiency measures (with ‘directional distance functions’ as dual counterparts). As they explain, the ratio measure for profit efficiency on which we focus here (with the McFadden gauge function as a dual version; see Section 4.2) fits in this framework as a special case. Actually, our following arguments can be extended to the general class of measures considered by Chambers et al. (1998). For compactness, we abstract from discussing this extension here, and restrict to briefly indicating the relationship with these authors’ general framework at the end of Section 4.2.

3.2 Measuring shadow cost and profit inefficiency

Not only the set T but also price vectors are often imperfectly observed, or the prices that are observed may not reflect the true opportunity costs perceived by producers. In that case a *shadow price* approach can be followed, i.e. basically those prices are selected that are ‘most favorable’ to the observation under evaluation (see, e.g., Färe, Grosskopf and Nelson (1990)). Below we consider the extreme case where the evaluator only knows $p_k \in \mathbb{R}_+^q$ and $w_k \in \mathbb{R}_+^l$, while excluding the zero vector. In words, we assume that prices can take any non-negative value, but they can not all be zero simultaneously. Note that, while we exclude the case where all input and output prices are zero, we still allow for zero (shadow) prices for some input and/or output commodities.

Shadow cost efficiency. Using $OM(S) \subseteq T$ the (incomplete information) counterpart of (9) can be defined as (for some $k \in S$)

$$C_{OM(S)}^I(z_k, \mathbb{R}_+^l) = \max_{w \in \mathbb{R}_+^l} \left\{ \frac{c_{OM(S)}(z_k, w)}{x_k w} \mid x_k w > 0 \right\}. \quad (13)$$

To show how one can compute this measure, we have to reformulate it. In this ratio formulation prices can be scaled without affecting the value of $C_{OM(S)}^I(z_k, \mathbb{R}_+^l)$. In fact, shadow prices as obtained within the non-parametric approach typically have a ratio interpretation only. That is, they express the value of one commodity relative to that of other commodities, but they bear no direct interpretation in terms of the absolute value of each commodity, at least not without additional price information. Thus, we can set the ‘shadow’ cost level of producer k equal to unity without losing the informational content of the corresponding (relative) shadow prices, i.e. we can use

$$C_{OM(S)}^I(z_k, \mathbb{R}_+^l) = \max_{w \in \mathbb{R}_+^l} \{c_{OM(S)}(z_k, w) \mid x_k w = 1\}. \quad (14)$$

Further using definitions (7) and (10), we can equivalently reformulate (14) as

$$C_{OM(S)}^I(z_k, \mathbb{R}_+^l) = \max_{w \in \mathbb{R}_+^l, c} \{c \mid x_k w = 1 \text{ and } c \leq x_s w \text{ for all } s \in S \text{ for which } y_s \geq y_k\}. \quad (15)$$

This last formulation makes clear that simple linear programming tools suffice to compute

$C_{OM(S)}^I(z_k, \mathbb{R}_+^l)$. The implicit ‘benefit-of-the-doubt’ pricing, i.e. the selection of most favorable (shadow) prices, is reflected in the max operator. Obviously, the index $C_{OM(S)}^I(z_k, \mathbb{R}_+^l) \in [0, 1]$ gives an upper bound for the ratio measure $C_T(z_k, w_k)$ under incomplete price and incomplete technology information.

Shadow profit efficiency. Similarly, we can use shadow prices to deal with incomplete price information (i.e. p_k unknown) to analyze profit efficiency. Then, the analogues of the profit efficiency measures (11) and (12) are respectively

$$\Pi_S^+(z_k, \mathbb{R}_+^q) = \max_{p \in \mathbb{R}_+^q} \left\{ \frac{z_k p}{\pi_S(z_k, p)} \mid \pi_S(z_k, p) > 0 \right\} \quad (16)$$

and

$$\Pi_S^-(z_k, \mathbb{R}_+^q) = \max_{p \in \mathbb{R}_+^q} \left\{ \frac{\pi_S(z_k, p)}{z_k p} \mid \pi_S(z_k, p) \leq 0 \text{ and } z_k p < 0 \right\}. \quad (17)$$

These measures can be re-expressed as

$$\Pi_S^+(z_k, \mathbb{R}_+^q) = \max_{p \in \mathbb{R}_+^q} \{z_k p \mid z_s p \leq 1 \text{ for all } s \in S\} \quad (18)$$

and

$$\Pi_S^-(z_k, \mathbb{R}_+^q) = \max_{p \in \mathbb{R}_+^q, u \in \mathbb{R}_+} \{u \mid z_k p = -1 \text{ and } z_s p \leq -u \text{ for all } s \in S\}. \quad (19)$$

The possibility of zero actual profit and non-zero maximal profit is captured in $\Pi_S^+(z_k, \mathbb{R}_+^q)$, while the possibility of non-zero actual profit and zero maximal profit is captured in $\Pi_S^-(z_k, \mathbb{R}_+^q)$. The only remaining problem occurs when producer k is profit efficient only at prices that generate a zero profit level, i.e.

$$\max_{p \in \mathbb{R}_+^q} \{z_k p \mid z_k p \geq z_s p \text{ for all } s \in S\} = \min_{p \in \mathbb{R}_+^q} \{z_k p \mid z_k p \geq z_s p \text{ for all } s \in S\} = 0. \quad (20)$$

Such cases can be detected using linear programming tools. Clearly, we cannot reject profit efficiency when (20) holds.

Consistent with the idea of benefit of the doubt weighting we propose as a profit efficiency

measure

$$\Pi_S^I(z_k, \mathbb{R}_+^q) = \begin{cases} \max \{ \Pi_S^+(z_k, \mathbb{R}_+^q), \Pi_S^-(z_k, \mathbb{R}_+^q) \} & \text{if (20) does not hold} \\ 1 & \text{if (20) holds} \end{cases}. \quad (21)$$

The index $\Pi_S^I(z_k, \mathbb{R}_+^q) \in [0, 1]$ gives an upper bound for the ratio measure $\Pi_T(z_k, p_k)$ under incomplete price and incomplete technology information. Not only the mere efficiency value but also the fact whether (20) holds and, if (20) does not hold, whether $\Pi_S^+(z_k, \mathbb{R}_+^q)$ or $\Pi_S^-(z_k, \mathbb{R}_+^q)$ yields the maximum in (21) provides useful information, and is thus preferably considered together with the profit efficiency value. As our exposition makes clear, this information tells us whether the shadow prices that are implicitly used involve a profit, a loss or a break-even for the producer under study.

4 Bridging the gap: the economic meaning of DEA

The dual formulation of the linear programming problem (15) reveals a one-to-one relationship between the above measure for cost efficiency and the Debreu (1951)- Farrell (1957) input measure for technical efficiency.¹² Similarly, the dual problems of (18) and (19) show a relationship between the proposed measure for profit efficiency and the ‘McFadden gauge’ function (see McFadden (1978)). These dual interpretations bring to light the economic interpretation of DEA, which typically computes technical efficiency measures (Debreu Farrell measures) with respect to axiomatic approximations of the production possibility set. That is, it allows for interpreting these DEA measures as measures for violations of economically optimizing behavior.

¹²This relationship in fact illustrates the duality between cost functions and the Shephard input distance functions (Shephard (1970)), which have the same informational content as the Debreu-Farrell input technical efficiency measures. In particular, the Debreu-Farrell input measure for technical efficiency is reciprocal to the Shephard input distance function; see Debreu (1951) for more discussion.

4.1 Cost efficiency

The dual formulation of (15) is (for some $k \in S$)

$$C_{OM(S)}^I(z_k, \mathbb{R}_+^l) = \min_{\kappa \in \mathbb{R}_+, \lambda_s \in \mathbb{R}_{++}} \{ \kappa \mid \sum_{s \in S} \lambda_s x_s \leq \kappa x_k, \sum_{s \in S} \lambda_s = 1 \text{ and } \lambda_s y_s \geq \lambda_s y_k \text{ for all } s \in S \}. \quad (22)$$

This can equivalently be reformulated as

$$C_{OM(S)}^I(z_k, \mathbb{R}_+^l) = \min_{\kappa \in \mathbb{R}_+} \{ \kappa \mid (-\kappa x_k, y_k) \in CIM(S) \}. \quad (23)$$

Hence, $C_{OM(S)}^I(z_k, \mathbb{R}_+^l)$ can be computed as the maximum equiproportionate reduction of inputs within $CIM(S)$. This is precisely the Debreu-Farrell input measure defined with respect to $CIM(S)$. The fact that this reference production set is obtained falls in line with the general result that monotonizing and convexifying input requirement sets does not interfere with the analysis of cost efficiency; see Varian (1984) for more discussion. That is, the minimum cost level remains unaffected and thus $C_{OM(S)}^I(z_k, \mathbb{R}_+^l) = C_{CIM(S)}^I(z_k, \mathbb{R}_+^l)$. Hence, minimal cost reduction is also given by the maximal equiproportionate input shrinkage factor as computed with respect to $CIM(S)$.

We illustrate our discussion by means of Figure 3. This continues our example introduced in Figure 2, but now $S'_2 = \{(1, \dots, 5)\}$ and $z_s = (-x_s, y_0) \in \mathbb{R}_-^2 \times \mathbb{R}_+$, with $s \in S$; i.e. we include two additional observations. The input vectors are displayed in Figure 3. The input requirement sets associated with different sets of axioms are the same as those in Figure 2.

Let us first consider economic/cost efficiency. Suppose that the relative input prices correspond to the slope of the bold iso-cost line. Under these input prices, the vector x_1 is cost minimizing. Obviously, this conclusion does not change when imposing monotonicity and/or convexity on the input possibilities. The same result applies for measures of cost efficiency. For example, for the vectors x_4 and x_5 the associated cost efficiency ratios equal $0x_{4'}/0x_4$ and $0x_{5'}/0x_5$, respectively; monotonicity and convexity assumptions do not alter these results.

Next, turn to the situation of incomplete price information. From (23), an upper bound approximation for the cost efficiency measure is then provided by the Debreu-Farrell input measure as computed with respect to the convexified and monotonized input requirement set. The

resulting value equals $0x_{4''}/0x_4$ for x_4 and $0x_{5''}/0x_5$ for x_5 . The upper bound interpretation is immediate: $0x_{4''}/0x_4 > 0x_{4'}/0x_4$ and $0x_{5''}/0x_5 > 0x_{5'}/0x_5$. Further, cost efficiency is achieved by x_2 and x_3 ; both vectors meet the necessary condition for cost minimization under the (minimal) information that is available about technology and prices.

This example illustrates that DEA measures provide upper bound approximations for cost efficiency measures, and that imposing convexity can improve (i.e. lower) these upper bound estimates. Indeed, convexity does not interfere with economic efficiency results and imposing it does even enhance the upper bound interpretation of technical efficiency measures in terms of economic efficiency. However, it is worth to emphasize that imposing convexity does interfere with technical (or DEA-type) efficiency analysis as such; see for instance the results for x_5 .




Figure 3: The economic meaning of DEA

4.2 Profit efficiency

For profit efficiency we obtain as dual problem for (18)

$$\Pi_S^+(z_k, \mathbb{R}_+^q) = \left[\max_{\kappa \in \mathbb{R}, \lambda_s \in \mathbb{R}_+} \left\{ \kappa \mid \sum_{s \in S} \lambda_s z_s \geq \kappa z_k \text{ and } \sum_{s \in S} \lambda_s = 1 \right\} \right]^{-1}. \quad (24)$$

This measure captures (the inverse of) the maximum equiproportionate *expansion* of netputs

(or *scale augmentation*) within $CM(S)$. This is the McFadden gauge function as computed with respect to $CM(S)$.

$$\Pi_S^+(z_k, \mathbb{R}_+^q) = \left[\max_{\kappa \in \mathbb{R}} \left\{ \kappa \mid \kappa z_k \in CM(S) \right\} \right]^{-1}. \quad (25)$$

Similarly, the dual problem of (19) is

$$\Pi_S^-(z_k, \mathbb{R}_+^q) = \min_{\kappa \in \mathbb{R}, \lambda_s \in \mathbb{R}_+} \left\{ \kappa \mid \sum_{s \in S} \lambda_s z_s \geq \kappa z_k \text{ and } \sum_{s \in S} \lambda_s = 1 \right\} \quad (26)$$

$$= \min_{\kappa \in \mathbb{R}} \{ \kappa \mid \kappa z_k \in CM(S) \}. \quad (27)$$

This measure captures the maximum equiproportionate netput *reduction* (or *scale reduction*) within $CM(S)$. As such, it can be labeled the ‘inverse’ McFadden gauge function. Expressions (24) and (26) are consistent with the established fact that imposing monotonicity and convexity on production possibilities does not affect profit efficiency analysis, i.e. $\Pi_S^I(z_k, \mathbb{R}_+^q) = \Pi_{CM(S)}^I(z_k, \mathbb{R}_+^q)$.¹³

Note that (24) and (26) reveal alternative directions of measurement to evaluate profit efficiency under incomplete price information. Both directions fit within the general directional distance function framework to evaluate (shadow) profit efficiency discussed in Färe and Grosskopf (1997) and Chambers et al. (1998). Interestingly, the benefit of the doubt idea (underlying the shadow price approach that is followed) suggests (*endogenous*) selection of the *most favorable* direction of measurement.¹⁴

This benefit of the doubt idea also gives the economic intuition behind (24) and (26). First, for any price vector under which actual (and maximum) profit is positive, the maximum netput scale expansion (within $CM(S)$) gives the minimum proportional profit expansion (compare with (24)). Similarly, if actual (and maximum) profit is negative, then reducing netput scale to a certain degree (within $CM(S)$) always reduces the profit loss to the same degree (compare with (26)).¹⁵ Since we do not know the actual prices, we need to consider both scenarios, and the benefit-of-the-doubt idea suggests selecting the most favorable scenario (see (21)).

¹³See Varian (1984) and Banker and Maindiratta, (1988) for more discussion.

¹⁴See also Cherchye et al. (2010) for an elaborated discussion of this interpretation of the Mc Fadden gauge function in terms of profit efficiency.

¹⁵Observe that the benefit of the doubt principle calls for selecting prices that yield actual and maximal profit with the same sign, as this guarantees the profit efficiency measure to be non-negative.

5 Application

In the previous sections, we highlighted the interpretation of DEA models as measuring violations of economically optimizing behavior. Our following application on efficiency in academia illustrates how crucial the specification of an appropriate behavioral model is. In a first step, we evaluate universities' efficiency in terms of cost minimization, by following the shadow price approach that we presented above. In a following step, we analyze the (possibly distortive) effects of using nonverifiable assumptions regarding behavioral objectives and technical production possibilities.

Data and variables. Our application uses data on 133 US universities in 2011-2012.¹⁶ The universities in our sample are all reported in the top 500 of the Shanghai ranking in the year 2012. This ensures a certain degree of homogeneity in the sample. The sample consists of both public and private universities, where 89 universities are public and 44 are private. From the private universities, we only selected non-profit institutions, to guarantee that all universities in our sample share similar objectives.

We consider two inputs and three outputs. First, we use two categories of staff as university inputs: academic staff, which have teaching duties and conduct research, and other (non-academic) staff, which includes administrative and technical staff. Next, we use undergraduate student enrollments, graduate student enrollments and number of doctor's degrees granted as outputs. Table 1 provides some summary statistics for our selection of inputs and outputs.¹⁷

		Mean.	Std.	Min.	Max
Input	Academic staff	2284	1275	355	6297
	Other staff	5165	3537	963	21557
Output	Undergraduate enrollments	17833	10183	650	55016
	Graduate enrollments	5248	3216	757	16373
	Doctor's degrees	322	215	2	892

Table 1: Summary statistics data

¹⁶We retrieved our data from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES), which collects and analyzes detailed information on education in the United States.

¹⁷Staff and student enrollments are expressed in full-time equivalents.

Core model. We believe that cost minimization provides a suitable behavioral model to evaluate the efficiency of the universities in our sample. Indeed, we may reasonably argue that outputs are to a large extent exogenous (i.e. beyond the control of university managers), so that cost minimization for given outputs is a plausible assumption. Thus, following our argument to impose minimal prior structure (and to avoid unverifiable assumptions) for the production behavior that is evaluated, the cost efficiency measure $C_{OM(S)}^I$ (or, equivalently, its dual specification $C_{CIM(S)}^I$) constitutes an appropriate efficiency measure for the setting that we consider here. Therefore, we will use this measure as our core efficiency measure in our following analysis.

Table 2 presents some summary statistics on the efficiency scores for our core model. We find that the average cost efficiency in the sample equals 0.86, which indicates that the average cost reduction potential amounts to 14%. Interestingly, the average efficiency is rather high, which conforms to our expectation that most universities effectively do operate in a (nearly) cost minimizing manner.

Next, when distinguishing between public and private universities, we observe that public universities operate on average more cost efficient than their private counterparts. Moreover, when focusing on the median efficiency measures, we find that more than 50% of the public universities turns out to be cost efficient, while the opposite conclusion applies to private universities. In this respect, a Wilcoxon rank-sum test for the null hypothesis that public and private universities achieve the same efficiency level returns a p-value of only 9,9%. This significant difference seems to indicate that private universities must have (slightly) different objectives than simply cost minimization.

	Mean	Min.	1 st Qu.	Median	3 rd Qu.	Max.
$C_{OM(S)}^I = C_{CIM(S)}^I$	0.86	0.28	0.76	0.98	1.00	1.00
→ public	0.90	0.33	0.81	1.00	1.00	1.00
→ private	0.83	0.30	0.68	0.97	1.00	1.00
Π_S^I	0.62	0.23	0.42	0.58	0.85	1.00
$BCC^I = C_{CM(S)}^I$	0.70	0.20	0.55	0.69	0.87	1.00

Table 2: Summary statistics efficiency results

Alternative specifications. In what follows, we discuss two alternative efficiency measures that build on stronger prior assumptions regarding the objectives and production possibilities

underlying the observed university behavior. As we will show, these measures do indicate a considerable amount of inefficient behavior. Because the assumptions underlying the two efficiency measures are difficult to motivate a priori, we argue that the differences with the efficiency results for our core model should be interpreted as indicating an ill-specified behavioral model (and not inefficiency per se). This clearly illustrates the basic argument of our paper: erroneous production assumptions may substantially distort the efficiency analysis (and the conclusions that are drawn from it).

Our first alternative measure uses the assumption that universities pursue profit maximization instead of cost minimization. Table 2 gives the corresponding results for the profit efficiency measure Π_S^I . For our sample, we find that the average value of Π_S^I amounts to only 0.62, which is considerably below the average cost efficiency value that we obtained before (i.e. 0.86). This result should actually not be surprising as profit maximization is a substantially stronger assumption than cost minimization. However, we find it hard to motivate this assumption for the current setting (which contains only public and private non-profit institutions). Therefore, in our interpretation the substantial amount of profit inefficiency primarily reveals an ill-specified model of university behavior. In turn, this provides an additional motivation for using our core model of cost minimization.

Our second alternative measure maintains cost minimization as the behavioral objective but puts additional structure on the production possibilities. We recall that, in its dual interpretation, our core model corresponds to the measure $C_{CIM(S)}^I$, which uses the Axioms 1, 2 and 4. To define our alternative efficiency measure, we replace Axiom 4 (i.e. convexity in input space) by the stronger Axiom 3 (i.e. convexity in netput space). Following a similar argument as above, we can show that this obtains the shadow cost efficiency measure

$$C_{CM(S)}^I(z_k, \mathbb{R}_+^I) = \min_{\kappa \in \mathbb{R}_+, \lambda_s \in \mathbb{R}_{++}} \{ \kappa | \sum_{s \in S} \lambda_s x_s \leq \kappa x_k, \sum_{s \in S} \lambda_s = 1 \text{ and } \sum_{s \in S} \lambda_s y_s \geq y_k \}. \quad (28)$$

Actually, the expression on the right hand side defines the technical input efficiency measure that was presented by Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984), which is widely used in DEA applications. We denote the measure as BCC^I in Table 2. We find that the average value for this measure amounts to no more than 0.70, which again is significantly below the one for our core

model. Similar to before, we conclude that the convexity assumption has a substantial impact on the efficiency results. In our opinion, because there is no a priori argument to use Axiom 3 as a valid production assumption for the setting at hand, this provides an additional motivation for using our core model here.

6 Summary and concluding discussion

We have reconsidered the economic motivation of DEA by highlighting its behavioral interpretation. Duality relationships can justify the use of certain production postulates in order to draw inference about economic efficiency performance, and so rationalize the use of certain DEA models. This potential use of DEA is all the more attractive since its engineering motivation is often unpersuasive. Importantly, the appropriate DEA model depends on the economic efficiency concept that is under consideration. In fact, this perspective may institute original efficiency evaluation models; see e.g. Cherchye et al. (2008, 2011 and 2012) who develop new nonparametric methodology for analyzing multi-output production by adopting a similar behavioral perspective of DEA.

We plead for carefully checking the validity of axioms that can interfere with the test results, and for investigating the sensitivity of the results with respect to these axioms if it is difficult to verify them empirically. In our opinion, such practice falls in line with the non-parametric philosophy, which advocates minimal risk of specification error. Our empirical application demonstrated the importance of carefully specifying the behavioral production model in order to obtain a meaningful efficiency analysis. In this application we first motivated cost minimization as a good behavioral assumption to evaluate the efficiency of US universities. Next, we showed that our efficiency conclusions were very sensitive to alternative assumptions regarding the behavioral objective (profit maximization versus cost minimization) and production possibilities (convexity in netput space instead of input space).

Three further points pertain to our specification of the production-decision problem. First, the economic efficiency tests and measures discussed above implicitly assume that prices do not vary with quantities and that the eventual quantities and prices are perfectly anticipated by producers. The presented economic efficiency measures can be employed to quantify violations

of these hypotheses. However, when different assumptions seem more appropriate, then the behavioral model is to be adapted, which in turn can motivate alternative DEA models (e.g. the monotone hull model (see (3)); compare with Cherchye et al. (2000) and Kuosmanen and Post (2002)).

Second, for expositional convenience we have restricted attention to producers that seek to minimize cost or maximize profit given the production technology and the input-output prices. In many environments, we need to impose additional restrictions, e.g. due to the non-discretionary nature of exogenously fixed inputs or outputs or because producers face additional cost or revenue constraints (see, e.g., Färe and Grosskopf (1994)). In a similar vein, there may be specific characteristics of the data that should be accounted for when designing the appropriate efficiency evaluation model: input or output values may not be continuous but subject to discreteness, interval or categorical restrictions (see, e.g., Cooper, Seiford and Tone (2007)). Once more, different specifications of the production-decision problems entail alternative efficiency analysis (DEA) models.

Third, it may often be useful to include additional technological information, to obtain a strengthened efficiency analysis. For example, one may want to include specific assumptions regarding the prevalent returns-to-scale, conditional convexity or local (instead of global) convexity properties of the production technology (see e.g. Kuosmanen (2001), Fried et al. (2008), Cook and Seiford (2009)). To focus our discussion, we did not explicitly consider such assumptions here. However, our basic argument pleads for using these assumptions only if they can be motivated convincingly prior to the actual DEA evaluation (e.g. by available technology information or, alternatively, by duality relationships to particular economic objectives).

Summarizing, the core idea of this paper is that starting from a careful specification of the production-decision problem, which depends on the specific application setting, can provide economic motivation of alternative and perhaps even novel DEA models. We believe that it is important to strongly hold on to this economic perspective in practical applications, rather than ‘blindly’ resorting to standard, so-called ‘well-established’ models. In our opinion this forms a natural precondition for meaningful DEA applications.

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